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Abstract—The potential for cascading failure in power systems
adds substantially to overall reliability risk. Monte Carlo sam-
pling can be used with a power system model to estimate this
impact, but doing so is computationally expensive. This paper
presents a new approach to estimating the risk of large cascading
blackouts triggered by multiple contingencies. The method uses
a search algorithm (Random Chemistry) to identify blackout-
causing contingencies, and then combines the results with outage
probabilities to estimate overall risk. Comparing this approach
with Monte Carlo sampling for two test cases (the IEEE RTS-96
and a 2383 bus model of the Polish system) illustrates that the
new approach is at least two orders of magnitude faster than
Monte Carlo, without introducing measurable bias. Moreover,
the approach enables one to compute the sensitivity of overall
blackout risk to individual component-failure probabilities in the
initiating contingency, allowing one to quickly identify low-cost
strategies for reducing risk. By computing the sensitivity of risk
to individual initial outage probabilities for the Polish system,
we found that reducing three line-outage probabilities by 50%
would reduce cascading failure risk by 33%. Finally, we used
the method to estimate changes in risk as a function of load.
Surprisingly, this calculation illustrates that risk can sometimes
decrease as load increases.
Index Terms—Cascading failure, Monte Carlo sampling, power
systems reliability
I. INTRODUCTION
Large blackouts are low-probability, high-impact events;
i.e., they happen infrequently, but when they do happen,
they can lead to catastrophic social and economic effects,
such as the North American blackouts of Aug. 2003 [1]
and Sept. 2011 [2]. For this reason cascading failure risk
assessment is increasingly required by reliability standards
(e.g., [3]) and is a focus of IEEE Power and Energy Society
activities [4].
A primary goal of reliability risk analysis methods is to pro-
duce statistical reliability measures, such as Expected Energy
Not Supplied (EENS), that allow one to compare different
versions of a particular system, or to evaluate changes in a
system over time. The science and practice of Monte Carlo
(MC) methods for power system reliability studies are well
established [5], particularly for evaluating generation and
transmission adequacy. However, for some types of problems,
Monte Carlo methods can require many samples to produce
high-confidence statistical results, causing the approach to be
computationally prohibitive or even infeasible in some cases
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[6]. Some studies reduce the computational effort due to sam-
pling by: 1) variance reduction techniques [7], 2) state-space
pruning [8], 3) parallel and distributed computation [6], 4)
pseudo-sequential simulation [9], or 5) Artificial Neural Net-
works [10]. Generally, the results provide small improvements
(typically less than a factor of 10 speedup). To our knowledge,
[10] describes an approach with the most substantial speedup:
a factor of 45 over standard Monte Carlo.
Methods for applying sampling techniques to cascading
failure risk estimation are less well established [4], for several
reasons. First, the simulation of cascading failures remains a
difficult problem, making it difficult to estimate the eventual
impact (typically measured in the amount of lost load) of a
cascade-triggering disturbance. As a result, standard power
system reliability models tend to capture only one or two
outage generations, ignoring the impact of subsequent out-
ages [11]. Second, even if cascading sizes can be accurately
estimated, those sizes can be at any scale: from a few MW
to tens of GW. The nature of cascading gives rise to the
well-documented power-law in blackout sizes [12], [13]. This
implies that the occurrence probabilities of particular com-
binations of outages (and operator errors) that could trigger
large cascading failures are very low, making it necessary to
observe several representative events to obtain an accurate risk
estimate [14]. Third, the size of the search space of all possible
n − k contingencies that might trigger a cascade, where n is
the number of components that might fail and k is the number
that did fail, is enormous and grows exponentially with n
and k. This further increases the need for a large number of
simulations.
Despite these challenges, there are a number of studies
focused on the modeling of cascading failures (e.g., [11], [15]–
[17]). A smaller number of papers have adapted sampling
techniques to the problem of cascading failure risk estimation
[11], [18]. In doing so, some have used variance reduction
techniques to reduce the computational effort [19]–[22], which
led to a speedup factor of 5-10 in [19], and 2-4 in [22].
Non-sampling approaches, such as branching process models
[23], [24], can provide efficient estimates of risk, but abstract
away some details, such as the ability to compute the relative
contributions of particular outages to overall risk.
In our prior work [25], we adapted a search algorithm,
known as Random Chemistry (RC), to the problem of finding
large collections of n−k contingencies that lead to cascading
failure. However, this initial work did not explain how the
approach could be used for risk estimation. In this paper,
we derive a method to use the Random Chemistry algorithm
to estimate blackout risk due to cascading failure, given a
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2few simplifying assumptions, and compare the computational
efficiency of our approach with that of Monte Carlo sampling.
This paper builds on preliminary results reported in [26] and
[27], extending our method to compute the relative impacts
of individual components on overall risk and showing how
increasing load and generator dispatch method impact risk.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II defines cascading failure risk and introduces two general ap-
proaches to estimate risk. Section III describes our method for
using Random Chemistry for cascading failure risk estimation,
and section IV presents simulation results. Finally, section V
provides our conclusions.
II. TWO APPROACHES TO RISK ESTIMATION
A standard measure of risk due to a random disturbance is
the product of event probability and its severity (or cost) [4]. If
S(C, x) is a measure of the severity of the events proceeding
from an arbitrary disturbance C to a system at a particular state
x, then the risk due to C is:
R(C, x) = Pr(C)S(C, x) (1)
If we denote the set of all possible disturbances by Ω, then
the system risk is:
R(x) =
∑
∀c∈Ω
R(c, x) =
∑
∀c∈Ω
Pr(c)S(c, x) (2)
In this paper, C denotes a random disturbance, while c (the
lower case) denotes an individual disturbance. Therefore, one
can think of S(C, x) as a random variable that maps a random
event C to its severity, and interpret R(x) as E[S(C, x)], i.e.,
the expected value of S(C, x).
Since it may not be feasible to compute the severity of all
disturbances for a system, one approach for estimating system
risk is to estimate R(x) from a smaller sample of all possible
disturbances. One option is Monte Carlo sampling, in which
one draws randomly from Ω based on the probability function
Pr(C). The average severity then converges to the true risk,
given a sufficiently large set of samples:
RˆMC(x) =
1
|Ωa|
∑
c∈Ωa
S(c, x) (3)
where Rˆ is an estimated value of R in this and subsequent
notations, Ωa is a set that results from sampling randomly
from Ω, and |Ωa| is the number of elements in Ωa. Note that
Ωa may include duplicates and the empty set, depending on
the sampling approach.
A key problem with this approach is that there are many
events for which S(c, x) = 0, which means that Monte Carlo
will spend a lot of time sampling from events that have no
impact on R(x). Alternatively, if one could sample exclusively
from the subspace ΩB such that S(c, x) > 0,∀c ∈ ΩB , and
we somehow knew the size of this subset, then risk could be
more efficiently estimated by computing:
Rˆ(x) =
|ΩB |
|Ωb|
∑
c∈Ωb
Pr(c)S(c, x) (4)
where Ωb is a representative subset sampled from ΩB , i.e.,
Ωb ⊆ ΩB . Clearly, (4) converges to (2) as Ωb → ΩB . In order
to avoid a biased outcome when |Ωb|  |ΩB |, Ωb needs to
be an unbiased sample, such that it provides a representative
sample of ΩB across a range of event sizes and probabilities.
The idea in (4) is somewhat similar to importance sampling
[28].
In this paper, we develop a method for estimating cascading
blackout risk in power systems based on (4), and compare the
convergence speed with Monte Carlo sampling in (3).
III. METHOD
The specific focus of this paper is estimating risk due to
cascading failures triggered by exogenously-caused branch
(transmission line or transformer) outage contingencies. In this
case, each contingency c ∈ Ω is a subset of the branches in the
grid (c ⊆ {1, ..., n}), and Ω is the set of all possible branch
outage combinations. While there are other types of contin-
gencies that might trigger cascades, branch outages provide
a useful starting point. Adapting the method to incorporate
other type of contingencies (e.g., generator outages) is trivial.
In this paper, we assume that the exogenously-caused branch
outages are statistically independent, such that for two single
contingencies ci and cj , Pr(ci ∩ cj) = Pr(ci) Pr(cj). While
there are methods in the literature for modeling common
mode outages (e.g., [29]) and other types of correlations (e.g.,
[30]), the risk from these correlations is not captured in the
results presented here. Verifying the efficiency of the Random
Chemistry risk estimation method for the case of correlated
outages and other types of contingencies remains for future
work.
In this paper, S(c, x) represents the output of a simulator
that gives blackout sizes in MW, resulting from any initiating
contingency c applied to the system with state x such that
0 ≤ S(c, x) ≤ S0, where S0 is the total load in the system.
In general, Monte Carlo sampling can quickly estimate R(x)
for blackouts of small sizes. However, because of the heavy-
tailed statistics of cascading failures, estimating the risk due to
larger blackouts is more difficult. Here, we focus on computing
the risk resulting from blackouts larger than some fraction
0 < α < 1 of S0. Specifically, we study the risk of blackouts
5% and larger, i.e., for S(C, x) ≥ 0.05S0. In order to do so,
we replace S(C, x) in (3) with Sα(C, x), where:
Sα(C, x) =
{
S(C, x) S(C, x) ≥ αS0
0 otherwise
A. Risk from minimal contingencies
A unique aspect of the Random Chemistry algorithm (see
Appendix I and [25]) is that it is designed to find “minimal”
blackout-causing contingencies. A minimal blackout-causing
contingency is a set of outages that result in a large blackout
(in this paper we define large as ≥ 5%), but would not
result in a large blackout if any one of the outages in the
multiple-contingency had not occurred. For brevity we refer
to disturbances of this sort as malignancies. Formally, a set
of outages d is a malignancy if S(d, x) ≥ 0.05S0 and
3@c′ ∈ Ω : c′ ⊂ d∧ S(c′, x) ≥ 0.05S0. In order to use the data
from Random Chemistry, we need to be able to estimate the
risk from all n− k contingencies, including the non-minimal
ones, from data about malignancies. To do so, we make the
following assumption:
Assumption 1: Given a malignancy d, which triggers a
blackout of size S(d, x), the blackout sizes triggered by all
supersets of d can be estimated by the size of blackout
triggered by d, i.e., ∀c′′ ⊃ d→ S(c′′, x) = S(d, x).
Clearly, Assumption 1 does not hold for every case. There
are some superset contingencies that trigger smaller blackouts
and some supersets that cause larger blackouts. In Appendix
II, we evaluate Assumption 1, comparing the actual blackout
sizes of all n− 3 supersets with the values that are estimated
by minimal n− 2 subsets for the Polish system (described in
section IV). We find that Assumption 1 causes the n− 3 risk
estimate to be 2.5% higher than the actual value for n − 3
risk. Given that the n − 3 risk is 24.0% of the total risk, the
total impact of Assumption 1 on the overall risk estimate is
to increase it by only 0.6%.
As one adds more components to a minimal malignancy,
making larger supersets, the blackout size difference between
the two events becomes larger, but because the probability of
high order events (n − k for k ≥ 4) is orders of magnitude
lower than probability of its malignancy subset, the overall
impact becomes much smaller, and at some point negligible
for high order events.
This section shows, by a small example, how to use
Assumption 1 to estimate risk efficiently using the minimal
contingency data that Random Chemistry provides.
Let us assume that in a small system with 5 transmission
lines, Random Chemistry has found an n − 3 malignancy,
d1 = {1, 2, 3}. (By definition, this means that none of the
n − 2 subset contingencies, c′1 = {1, 2}, c′2 = {1, 3} and
c′3 = {2, 3}, cause a 5% or larger blackout.) Using our
previous assumption that line failures are independent, the
exact risk associated with d1 and all its supersets is:
R(dˆ1, x) =S(d1, x)p1p2p3(1− p4)(1− p5)+
S(c′′1 , x)p1p2p3p4(1− p5)+
S(c′′2 , x)p1p2p3(1− p4)p5+
S(c′′3 , x)p1p2p3p4p5 (5)
where dˆ1 denotes d1 together with all its supersets: c′′1 =
{1, 2, 3, 4}, c′′2 = {1, 2, 3, 5} , c′′3 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, and pi is
the line-failure probability for line i. Given Assumption 1,
S(d1, x) = S(c
′′
i , x),∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, which means that:
R(dˆ1, x) = S(d1, x)p1p2p3[(1− p4)(1− p5)+
p4(1− p5) + (1− p4)p5 + p4p5] (6)
Expanding the term in the bracket shows that it equals 1, which
means that:
R(dˆ1, x) = S(d1, x)p1p2p3 = S(d1, x) Pr(dˆ1) (7)
where Pr(dˆ1) is the probability of the malignancy d1 and
all of its supersets, i.e., any event that includes at least the
branches in d1. A similar formulation holds for supersets
of any malignancy. Therefore, Assumption 1 enables us to
estimate risk of a malignancy and its supersets solely using
the information provided by the malignancy itself. In general,
for each malignancy d, we have:
R(dˆ, x) = S(d, x) Pr(dˆ) = S(d, x)
(∏
i∈d
pi
)
(8)
B. General Random Chemistry risk estimation
Our method separately estimates the risk due to n− 2 and
n − 3 malignancies. We use the symbol Ωm,k ⊂ Ω to be the
set of all n−k malignancies. After i runs, Random Chemistry
will have found a certain number of events from each Ωm,k
set. Let ik be the number of times that Random Chemistry has
found a not-necessarily-unique member of Ωm,k and ΩRC,k
be the set of unique members found. By tracking the rate at
which unique members of Ωm,k are found, if ik is sufficiently
large, we can estimate the size of Ωm,k (see section III-C). Let
mˆk be this estimate. Given this notation, and the derivation
in (7), we can simultaneously capture the n − k risk from a
set of malignancies and all of their supersets based on (4) and
(8), as follows:
RˆRC,k(x) =
mˆk
|ΩRC,k|
∑
d∈ΩRC,k
S(d, x)
(∏
i∈d
pi
)
(9)
where RˆRC,k(x) is the estimated n − k blackout risk by
Random Chemistry. The results in section IV indicate that
the sum of these values over k gives a reasonable estimate of
total blackout risk:
RˆRC(x) =
kmax∑
k=2
RˆRC,k(x) (10)
We have set kmax = 5 while running Random Chemistry
previously, since larger multiple contingencies are highly
improbable, and (at least for the case of uncorrelated outages)
have a minuscule contribution to the total risk. However, the
size of the n − 5 and n − 4 sets are so large that for real-
world systems, it is not computationally practical to estimate
mˆ5 and mˆ4. Thus we generally use kmax = 3 for risk
calculations. Since this captures the risk from an increasingly
large collection of n − {2, 3} malignancies and all of their
supersets, the results appear to be highly representative of the
true system risk (see section IV).
Note that there is a caveat in considering the malignancy
supersets as in (9). Every contingency set causing a large
blackout contains a malignancy, but this malignancy is not
necessarily unique. The contingencies that contain more than
one unique malignancy are considered more than once in
(9). For example, if {1,2} and {1,3} were both malignan-
cies in a system, the superset {1,2,3} would be taken into
account two times in (9); once in S({1, 2}, x)p1p2 and once
in S({1, 3}, x)p1p3. However, the number of these kinds of
supersets is normally much lower than the total number of
supersets of any order, so the overall error that they cause is
4negligible. In this paper, we are mainly studying the n−2 and
n−3 risk, so we counted the exact number of n−3 supersets
that have been counted more than once in the Polish system.
Our inspection indicated that out of the total of 1,562,760
n − 3 supersets of n − 2 malignancies, 21,771 supersets
(1.4%) included more than one malignancy subset, and thus
were counted more than once. Note that the exact number of
malignancies that will be counted more than once depends on
the particular system. It is also noteworthy that each of the
higher order supersets may include more malignancies than
each of the lower order ones, however, as mentioned before,
the higher order contingencies have orders of magnitude lower
probabilities and thus have an infinitesimal impact on the
overall risk.
It is important to note that we find, in section IV, that
Assumption 1 and the above caveat do not measurably change
the risk estimation results relative to the Monte Carlo estimate,
which computes risk based on the exact probability and
blackout sizes of all contingencies.
C. Estimating the Size of Each n− k Collection
Initially, Random Chemistry primarily finds malignancies
that are unique (not found previously). However, as the
number of identified malignancies increases, the algorithm
finds duplicates more frequently. By measuring the rate at
which the algorithm finds new unique contingencies of a
given size k, one can estimate the total number of minimal
dangerous n−k contingencies that cause blackouts. There are
a variety of ways to estimate the set-size |Ωm,k| as Random
Chemistry progresses, such that: lim
ik→∞
mˆk(ik) = |Ωm,k|. In
[25], we suggested an approach based on measuring the rate
at which the algorithm is finding new malignancies. In this
paper, we use another approach based on the number of unique
malignancies found vs. the number of Random Chemistry
runs. To illustrate, consider a jar of N balls numbered 1, ..., N .
If balls are removed from the jar one at a time with the same
probability (and then replaced), one can mathematically show
that the expected number of unique balls drawn after i draws
(Ni) follows:
Ni = N(1− eri) (11)
where r = ln
(
1− 1N
)
. Based on this idea, we suggest an
alternative exponential model, which was empirically found
to be more accurate for our application. We found that the
number of unique malignancies found by Random Chemistry
is best represented by the Cumulative Distribution Function
(CDF) of the exponential Weibull distribution. Specifically, the
number of unique n − k malignancies in the set ΩRC,k after
ik runs follows:
|ΩRC,k(ik)| ∼ mˆk
(
1− e−( ikλ )µ
)ν
(12)
The parameters λ, µ, ν and mˆk (the estimate of interest) can
be found by nonlinear least-squares fitting to a sequence of
data for ik and |ΩRC,k(ik)|. Fig. 1 shows the results of this
method, where the the sizes of n−2 and n−3 malignancy sets
are estimated for the Polish system. The results shown for n−2
are for three separate runs of Random Chemistry searching for
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Figure 1. The number of unique (a) n−2, and (b) n−3 malignancies found
(ΩRC,k ,solid line) and the estimate of the set size (mˆk , dashed line) vs. the
number of Random Chemistry runs that led to an n− 2 (i2) and n− 3 (i3)
malignancy, respectively, in the Polish system.
malignancies in the Polish system (Fig. 1a). All three estimates
converged to mˆk = 540, which is the true number of n − 2
malignancies, as verified by exhaustive search. Fig. 1b shows
that the estimate of mˆ3 is converging to about 6.4× 104.
D. Sensitivity of risk to component-failure probability
As previously suggested, it is possible to use the Random
Chemistry risk estimation approach in (9) to find the sensitivity
of the overall risk to individual component-failure probability
in the initiating contingency. To do so, we compute the partial
derivative of RˆRC,k(x) with respect to each branch failure
probability pi and sum the result over k ∈ {2, 3} for all
branches, as follows:
∂RˆRC,k(x)
∂pi
=
mˆk
|ΩRC,k|
∑
d∈ΩRC,k
S(d, x)
∏
j∈d
j 6=i
pj
(13)
∂RˆRC(x)
∂pi
=
kmax∑
k=2
∂RˆRC,k(x)
∂pi
(14)
This type of sensitivity analysis is particularly useful in
finding critical components in a transmission system (see
section IV-C3). Note that (14) provides the sensitivity of
risk to individual outage probability in the initiating events,
and to keep this paper focused, we do not study the failure
probabilities when a cascade propagates. In future work, we
will identify the lines that fail frequently during the course
of cascades, and study the impact on risk of upgrading these
lines.
IV. RESULTS
We used two test systems to evaluate the proposed risk
estimation method. The first is the 73-bus RTS-96, which
5has 120 branches and 8550 MW of total load [29]. The
second test system is a model of the 2004 winter peak Polish
power system, which is available with MATPOWER [31].
This test system has 2896 branches (transmission lines and
transformers), 2383 buses, and 24.6 GW of total load. For the
Polish case, some of the transmission lines were overloaded
in the original system, so we increased line flow limits to
be the larger of the existing limit and 1.05 times the pre-
contingency line flows for each line, after increasing all loads
by 10%. We prepared the pre-contingency test cases for both
systems using a preventive security-constrained dc optimal
power flow (SCDCOPF) to make both cases n−1 secure with
respect to branch outages (see [27] for details). The n − 1
security constraints in the SCDCOPF model ensure that all
flows remain less than or equal to the long-term emergency
(LTE) rating after a single branch outage. The LTE rating is
assumed to be 110% of the normal flow limit for all lines.
The generation cost data, which is needed for the OPF, is not
readily available for RTS-96. In this paper, we took the cost
data from [32] based on the generation types in [29].
In both networks, we computed line failure probabilities
from transmission line failure rates (λ, outages/year), and
assumed that each failure lasts for 1 hour on average (that
the mean time to repair is 1 hour). Thus, the probability of
line i being in a non-working state during a particular sample
is pi = λi/8760, where 8760 is the number of hours in a year.
Note that this approximation is valid only for the case where
λi/8760 1, which is true, since all of the λ in the test systems
are approximately 1. As the failure rate data were not available
for the Polish system, we randomly assigned failure rates to
transmission lines, such that the mean and variance of λ’s were
equal to those in the RTS-96.
A. Simulator
To test our method, we used an updated version of the
cascading failure simulator used in [25]. In this simulator
(known as DCSIMSEP) line flows are computed using a dc
power flow calculation. When outages result in long-term
emergency (LTE) rating violations (assumed to be 110% of the
normal line flow limit), transmission lines trip in an amount
of time that is proportional to the magnitude of the overload,
such that more extreme overloads result in faster outages. The
time delay is set such that if the line flow is 50% above the
normal limit (that is the short-term emergency rating, STE),
the line will trip in 5 seconds. When line outages result in
the separation of a network into multiple connected com-
ponents (islands), a combination of fast generator ramping,
load shedding and generator tripping are used to restore a
balance between supply and demand in each island. After each
simulation, DCSIMSEP reports the number of line outages and
the amount of load shedding that occurred. Illustrative video
and source code for the simulator are available at [33].
DCSIMSEP does not describe several known mechanisms
of cascading failure, such as voltage collapse, dynamic insta-
bility or hidden failures in protection systems. However, the
risk analysis process proposed here can be used in combination
with any simulator that reports the blackout size, given an
initiating contingency. Future work will test the impact of
these additional mechanisms on the efficiency of the proposed
approach.
B. Comparing Random Chemistry approach to Monte Carlo
We applied the proposed method to our two test cases, and
estimated large blackout risk as a function of total compu-
tational effort. These results were compared to results from
a standard Monte Carlo simulation. The number of calls to
DCSIMSEP is used as our measure of computational effort,
because cascading failure simulation takes up the vast majority
of risk estimation run-time. Actual run-time is not used explic-
itly since it depends on many factors, including the extent to
which code is optimized. Each cascading failure simulation (by
a call to DCSIMSEP) in the risk estimation process takes 0.3
to 0.5 seconds on average for the Polish system1, depending
on the number of subsequent cascades. In our Monte Carlo
implementation, a contingency is simulated only if the number
of elements in the sampled contingency is 2 or larger, since the
system was initially n−1 secure. While each Monte Carlo run
needs either zero or one simulation, each successful Random
Chemistry run requires approximately 47 simulations (when
averaged over both successful and unsuccessful runs) on the
Polish system.
Figs. 2a and 2b show the Monte Carlo and Random Chem-
istry risk convergence for the RTS-96 and the Polish systems,
respectively. More specifically, Fig. 2a shows the convergence
of E[S0.05(C, x)] for the RTS-96, while Fig. 2b shows the
convergence of E[S0.05(C, x)] and E[S0.4(C, x)] for the Polish
system. In the case of RTS-96, the largest blackout caused by
n−2 and n−3 malignancies was less than 20% of total load,
therefore we only explored E[S0.05(C, x)].
Fig. 2 shows that the Random Chemistry approach is more
than two orders of magnitude faster than Monte Carlo for both
test systems. We also observe that Monte Carlo and Random
Chemistry are converging to similar values, providing evidence
that Assumption 1 does not measurably bias the results.
In addition, Table I compares the convergence numerically
for S ≥ 5% in the Polish system. We computed the mean,
variance and 95% confidence intervals (the range between
2.5th and 97.5th percentiles) for both Random Chemistry and
Monte Carlo by bootstrapping, where random samples were
taken with replacement from the original data. Results are
for 1000 resampling trials, where for each trial, the number
of samples were chosen for both Random Chemistry and
Monte Carlo such that they required the same number of calls
to the cascading failure simulator.
Table I shows that after 106 calls to the simulator, the
confidence interval for Monte Carlo is much wider than for
Random Chemistry. Note that the very minor drift in the
Random Chemistry confidence interval from 106 to 2 × 107
calls to the simulator is due to the improved estimate of mˆ3
(Fig. 1b).
1On a 2.66 GHz Intel Core i7 MacBook Pro with 8 GB of memory
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Figure 2. Cascading failure risk estimates using the Random Chemistry and Monte Carlo methods for the (a) RTS-96 and (b) Polish system, where S is
the blackout size. For each test case, three representative Monte Carlo runs and one Random Chemistry run (since runs for the latter are very consistent) are
shown.
Table I
COMPARISON OF MONTE CARLO (MC) AND RANDOM CHEMISTRY (RC)
RISK (IN KW) AFTER 106 AND 2× 107 CALLS TO THE SIMULATOR FOR
1000 BOOTSTRAPPING TRIALS
After 106 calls After 2× 107 calls
MC RC MC RC
Mean 53.03 50.25 50.32 50.48
Variance 21.87 0.007 0.95 0.000045
95% Confidence
Interval
44.54-
62.84
50.07-
50.36
48.34-
52.29
50.46-
50.49
C. Investigating the components of large blackout risk
There are a number of advantages that arise from computing
risk by sampling methods such as Random Chemistry or
Monte Carlo. With both methods, one can disaggregate Rˆ(x)
and compute the risk that comes from blackouts of different
sizes, e.g., compute the risk due to small, medium, and large
blackouts, or the risk from n − 2 and n − 3 contingencies,
although it takes much longer for Monte Carlo to find a
sufficient number of outages to do this type of disaggregation.
Sections IV-C1 and IV-C2 illustrate this calculation, and
section IV-D shows the disaggregated (in blackout size) risk
vs. load level.
A second advantage is the ability to find the sensitivity
of Rˆ(x) to the failure-rates of particular transmission lines.
Disaggregating Rˆ(x) and finding the most important compo-
nents that impact Rˆ(x) could have tremendous value to system
operators. For example, it may allow an operator to identify
particular actions (such as hardening particularly vulnerable
transmission lines, or reducing the load on some lines) that
can substantially reduce large blackout risk.
1) Risk from blackouts of different sizes: To illustrate the
separation of risk for different blackout sizes, Fig. 2b shows
the risk for E[S0.4(C, x)], i.e. for blackouts 40% or larger.
Disaggregating risk by blackout size is particularly useful if
one wants to know the impact of potential system changes,
such as the addition of a new transmission line, or changes in
load level. Understanding how these changes impact the risk
of blackouts of different sizes should allow for more informed
decision making. We study the problem of how risk changes
with load in section IV-D.
2) Risk from n−2 and n−3 contingencies: It is noteworthy
that the majority of the risk shown in Fig. 2 comes from
n− 2 malignancies. Because of the smaller number of n− 2
malignancies relative to n − 3 malignancies, the Random
Chemistry n− 2 risk estimate converges much faster than the
n − 3 risk estimate. However, well after the n − 2 risk has
converged, some small fluctuations in total risk remain, due
to changes in the minimal n− 3 set size estimation (see Fig.
1b).
In order to further understand the impact of n − 3 con-
tingencies on blackout risk, we further explored the details
of contingency sets found for the Polish system. The n − 3
risk is composed of two portions; a small part of the risk
is due to n − 3 malignancies (herein referred to as minimal
n−3 risk) with the remainder coming from non-minimal n−3
contingencies that are supersets of n−2 malignancies. To find
the latter portion, we post-processed the data to compute the
probabilities of all n−3 supersets of n−2 malignancies, using
the associated n− 2 blackout size based on Assumption 1, to
avoid simulating all the supersets. The results were similar (see
Table II) to what Monte Carlo finds when computing risk by
sampling from both minimal and non-minimal contingencies.
Table II shows the n−2 and n−3 estimates of risk by both
Monte Carlo and Random Chemistry methods for the Polish
system. Although the Monte Carlo risk estimates are similar
to those from Random Chemistry, Monte Carlo identifies far
fewer minimal n − 3 than non-minimal n − 3 contingencies,
thus providing much less information about the minimal n−3
risk. Specifically, Random Chemistry found 540 n − 2 and
38,212 n− 3 malignancies, whereas Monte Carlo found only
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Figure 3. (a) Sensitivity of risk to branch failure probability for all 2896
branches in the Polish system, (b) Complementary Cumulative Distribution
Function of sensitivities (one circle per branch); inset shows data for the 5%
of branches with the largest sensitivities. The three lines with the highest
sensitivities are marked with an asterisk.
440 n − 2, 41 minimal n − 3, and 830 non-minimal n −
3 contingencies. Note that, as Table II shows, 96.7% of the
Random Chemistry n−3 risk estimate (11.7 kW) was actually
attributable to n − 2 malignancies, with only 3.3% (0.4 kW)
due to n− 3 malignancies.
3) Risk Sensitivity: Fig. 3 shows the sensitivity of risk
to individual branch outage probabilities (derived from their
failure rates) in the Polish system, as computed from (14).
Clearly, the sensitivity data in Fig. 3 show a very heavy
tail; a very small number of components affect risk dispro-
portionately. This becomes particularly clear when we look
at the impact of particular lines on total risk, by computing
the risk sensitivity value times the outage probability. For
example, given the risk sensitivity of 1.41× 105 kW and the
outage probability of 1.06 × 10−4 for branch 96 (which has
the highest sensitivity value), and total risk of 50.5 kW in
the Polish system (Fig. 2), we find that this branch can adjust
29% of overall cascading failure risk by modifying its failure
probability.
These sensitivity values can be used to identify potential
risk-mitigation strategies. For example, transmission lines that
have a higher overall risk sensitivity factor might be targeted
for increased vegetation management or improved fault detec-
tion relaying systems, which may reduce the associated line-
outage probabilities. To illustrate this approach, we identified
the three branches with the highest sensitivity values, namely
branches 96, 23 and 169. After identifying the branches, we
Table II
ESTIMATED n− 2 AND n− 3 RISK IN THE POLISH SYSTEM.
MC risk
(kW)
RC risk
(kW)
Percent of RC risk due to
n− 2 minimal n− 3 minimal
n− 2 37.1 36.4 100% NA
n− 3 11.5 12.1 96.7% 3.3%
Total∗ 50.3 50.5 99.2% 0.8%
∗Note that Total includes risk from non-minimal n− 4’s, n− 5’s, etc.
reduced the three failure probabilities (p96, p23 and p169) by
half, and re-computed risk. This resulted in a 33% reduction
in total cascading failure risk.
D. Estimating risk as a function of load
Finally, in order to illustrate the potential of this approach
to perform more in-depth studies of cascading failure risk,
we used the Random Chemistry method to examine how
cascading failure risk changes with different load levels and
generator dispatch methods. To do so, we prepared n−1 secure
versions of both systems for a range of load levels from 50%
to 119% for RTS-96 and 50% to 115% for the Polish system.
119% was the highest load level at which SCDCOPF could
find a solution without load shedding in the pre-contingency
RTS-96 case. For the Polish system, load could increase up
to 110% before a small amount of load shedding was needed
to find a secure solution. For cases from 111% to 115% load,
less than 1% load shedding was required to achieve n − 1
security. For comparison purposes, we extended our study of
the Polish system up to 115% load.
Fig. 4 shows risk in the RTS-96 system for all load levels
for two different pre-contingency dispatch conditions. To make
the analysis more useful, the risk associated with different
blackout sizes are separately presented. Panel (a) shows the
results produced from a SCDCOPF dispatch at each load level.
In order to smooth out differences at adjacent points, each
point on the graph shows the rolling average of risk across
three consecutive integer percentage load levels (i.e., the datum
at 90% load is the average for 89%, 90%, and 91%).
It is interesting to note that very-large blackout risk is
greatest at about 70% load level, and decreases significantly
as the load increases beyond this level. The initial increase
in risk is similar to the findings in [34], [13], [20] and [30],
which report a phase transition in cascading failure risk as load
increases. However, depending on the dispatch method for the
pre-contingency system, the risk may decrease subsequently,
as Fig. 4a shows for SCDCOPF dispatch. The later decrease
in risk differs substantially from what is previously reported
in the literature.
Fig. 4b shows risk for the same load levels but with a
proportional dispatch method, in which we took the 119%
load case from SCDCOPF, and uniformly decreased the loads
and generators to each lower load level. This dispatch method
reduced risk substantially, and the relationship between load
and risk now becomes monotonic. Large blackout risk is
practically zero for the proportional dispatch cases. The pre-
contingency dispatch in this case is obviously more expensive
than that from the SCDCOPF, which indicates that there is
an important tradeoff between generation dispatch costs and
cascading failure risk.
Fig. 5 shows cascading failure risk vs. load level for
the Polish system, using SCDCOPF for the pre-contingency
dispatch. Again, the results suggest that that risk does not
always increase with load level. In fact, risk decreases to some
extent for load percentages between 100% and 110%, and to
a larger extent above 110% (the same cases for which some
load shedding, less than 1%, occurs during the pre-contingency
dispatch).
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Figure 4. Cascading failure risk vs. load level for RTS-96: (a) SCDCOPF, and (b) Proportional dispatch.
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Figure 5. Cascading failure risk vs. load level for the Polish system,
dispatched by SCDCOPF.
Inspection of the test systems indicates that the reduced risk
at higher load levels results from the way that SCDCOPF uses
more local generation with less long-distance transmission at
higher load levels. In other words, at moderate load levels,
the minimum cost generators are far from load centers, and
important transmission corridors are loaded closer to their
capacity. To illustrate this, Fig. 6 shows the total amount of
power flow on the 5% most sensitive branches, found from
(14), in RTS-96 and the Polish system. We observe in Fig.
6 that the total power flows on these critical lines follow the
same general pattern as risk in Figs. 4 and 5 for both systems.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper presents a new computationally efficient method,
based on the Random Chemistry algorithm in [25], for esti-
mating the risk of large (e.g., ≥ 5% of system load) cascading
blackouts. A comparison of this method to Monte Carlo sim-
ulation for two test cases (the IEEE RTS-96, and a model of
the Polish transmission system) shows that the new approach
is at least two orders of magnitude faster than Monte Carlo,
and does not introduce measurable bias into the estimate. The
computational efficiency of the Random Chemistry approach
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Figure 6. Total power flow magnitude on the 5% most sensitive branches in
the Polish system (solid circles, left axis) and RTS-96 (open symbols, right
axis).
comes from the way that it directly searches for large blackout-
causing contingencies, as opposed to Monte Carlo, which
samples broadly from all possible contingencies.
We disaggregated risk with respect to the resulting blackout
sizes and the sensitivity of risk to individual branch outage
probabilities in the initiating events. For the latter case, we
derived a method to use the data generated by the Ran-
dom Chemistry approach to quickly estimate the impact of
component outage probabilities on the overall risk. For the
Polish system, the results indicate that reducing the unplanned
outage probabilities on three transmission lines (e.g., by more
aggressive vegetation management) would produce a 33%
reduction in overall cascading failure risk.
In order to illustrate the utility of the proposed approach, we
computed how the risk of blackouts of various sizes changes
with load level. Surprisingly, the results indicate that risk can
sometimes decrease with increasing load, e.g., if generators
are dispatched according to a preventative security constrained
optimal power flow. However, if generators are dispatched
proportionally (all generations and loads change in equal ratios
with respect to a load level with low risk), blackout risk is
much smaller and risk increases monotonically with load. This
9illustrates an important tradeoff between economic efficiency
and blackout risk.
These results suggest a number of important topics for
future research. First, the results presented here rely on the
assumption that branch outages are uncorrelated and come
from a relatively simple cascading failure simulator. Future
work will seek to confirm that the efficiency gains associated
with the Random Chemistry approach persist after modeling
correlated outages and additional mechanisms of cascading. In
addition, we studied only the sensitivity of risk to initiating
events; studying the sensitivity of risk to events during a
cascade remains for future work. Finally, future research
is needed to transform the data that result from Random
Chemistry into effective strategies for reducing blackout risk.
APPENDIX
I. SUMMARY OF THE RANDOM CHEMISTRY ALGORITHM
The Random Chemistry algorithm is a stochastic set-size
reduction search strategy that can be used to efficiently (in
logarithmic time) find minimal subsets that are associated with
a certain outcome of interest. The algorithm was applied to
genomic data mining in [35], and was adapted to the problem
of finding n − k blackout-initiating contingencies in power
grids [25]. In summary, the Random Chemistry algorithm
operates as follows. Initially, we use the cascading failure
simulator from [25] (DCSIMSEP [33]) to find a large multiple
contingency c (an n− kinit contingency, where kinit ≥ 40) that
results in a large blackout. Because kinit is so large, this step
typically requires very few tries. Then, the algorithm stochas-
tically reduces c according to a logarithmically decreasing set
size reduction schedule (in this work we used {kinit = 80,
k2 = 40, k3 = 20, k4 = 14, k5 = 10, k6 = 7, kfinal = 5}) by
testing random subsets of the desired size until one is found
that causes a large blackout. If no such subset is found within a
pre-specified maximum number of tries T (we used T = 20),
the run is restarted from a new random n− kinit contingency.
The remaining set of size kfinal = 5 is exhaustively searched
(starting from k = 2 ) until a minimal n− k blackout-causing
contingency (2 ≤ k ≤ kfinal) is identified. This cycle can
then be repeated to obtain large collections of n− k minimal
hazardous contingencies.
II. EXPLORING ASSUMPTION 1
In this section, we test Assumption 1 for the Polish system
by comparing the actual blackout sizes of all n− 3 supersets
of all n − 2 malignancies with the estimated values, i.e.,
the blackout size of each n − 2 subset. For each n − 2
malignancy, there are n − 2 = 2894 supersets that were
simulated with DCSIMSEP for this comparison. We then
computed the percent deviation of each n − 3 blackout size
from its malignancy subset:
 =
Sact − Sest
Sest
× 100
where Sact is the actual blackout size of an n − 3 superset,
and Sest is the blackout size of its n− 2 subset. Fig. 7 shows
the proportional frequency of these deviations. We found that
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Figure 7. Proportional frequency of percent difference in actual minus
estimated blackout sizes caused by non-minimal n− 3 contingencies.
these deviations are generally in the range of -1.9% (10th
percentile) to 0.9% (90th percentile). Ultimately, Assumption
1 resulted in the estimated n − 3 blackout risk to be 2.5%
higher than the exact value obtained by using the actual n−3
blackout sizes.
Note that Assumption 1 provides a weaker estimation when
larger than one-extra-element supersets of malignancies are
considered. However, with larger supersets, the contingencies
become highly improbable, and make a negligible contribu-
tion to the total risk. Thus, we only need Assumption 1 to
work for supersets with few additional elements added to a
malignancy. This partially explains why the above assumption
does not measurably change the Random Chemistry risk
estimation results in section IV, relative to what is computed
by Monte Carlo.
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